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Aristotle on the Principles of Perceptible Body (Gen. Corr. 2.1-3)
By David E. Hahm
(The Ohio State University)
SAGP, April, 1993
Aristotle’s explanation of all physical change presupposes the
existence of some perceptible body in which the change may occur.1
Even the most fundamental change, genesis and destruction, cannot
occur, Aristotle claims, apart from perceptible body (Gen. Corr.
2.1.328b32-34). A knowledge of the principles (άρχαί) and elements
(σ τοιχείο) is therefore fundamental to understanding all physical
changes.2 In the first three chapters of book two of On Generation
and Corruption, Aristotle presents his most com prehensive and
detailed analysis of these principles.3 His conclusion is that there are,
in fact, three sorts of principles, possessing different degrees o f
ontological priority: (1) the substrate matter or potentially perceptible
body, (2) four perceptible contrarieties, hot, cold, wet, and dry, which
qualify the matter to constitute perceptible body; and (3) four
primary, actually perceptible bodies, fire, air, water, and earth, which
change into one another and combine to form everything in the
universe (2.1.329a 28-bl).
The interest of his discussion lies not only in the identification of

1 Many o f the ideas in this paper were first aired in the Faculty Seminar on
Aristotle’s Gen. Corr. held at the University of Cambridge (1990-91). I would like to
thank the members of the seminar for piquing my interest in and helping me better
understand this work. I am especially indebted to Myles Burnyeat, Geoffrey Lloyd,
and David Furley for many specific suggestions and criticisms, which helped me to
clarify my interpretation of the text. Work on this paper was supported by a Faculty
Professional Leave and Seed Grant from the Ohio State University and by Corpus
Christi College, Cambridge, which graciously extended me an appointment as Visiting
Fellow.
2 Aristotle has a terminological problem because he himself believes that the
material stuffs that earlier philosophers called "elements" (στοιχεία) are analyzable
into more ultimate elements or principles. His solution was to use the term "element"
(στοιχεΐον) and "principle" (άρχή) synonymously as generic terms for all three kinds
of principles that he will identify: (1) matter; (2) the four contrarieties, hot, cold, wet,
and dry; and (3) the four primary perceptible bodies, earth, water, air, and fire. The
latter (earth, water, air, and fire), which he regards as a subset o f the generic
principles or elements, he typically designates by three terms: "the first bodies" (τα
πρώτα σώματα), "the simple bodies" (τα απλά σώματα), or, in deference to the
traditional usage, "the so-called elements" (τα καλούμενα στοιχεία).
3 Hereafter I shall cite this work only by book, chapter, and page. For other
Aristotelian works I shall specify titles. Any unspecified references are to Gen. Corr.
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- 3 Aristotle ignores their disagreement, and instead finds merit in the
fact that all of them use these primary bodies to explain the genesis
and destruction of everything, either by the (monist) hypothesis of the
alteration (άλλοιουμενω ν, μεταβαλλόντων) of a single substrate
substance or by the (pluralist) hypothesis of aggregation and
separation (σύγκρισίς και διάκρισις) of multiple elem ents.6 To
A ristotle’s way o f thinking this entails that they have correctly
identified one type of principle or element of perceptible bodies. As a
result, he expresses agreement with them that these primary (material
bodies) are rightly ranked as "principles and elements" (άρχάς καί
στοιχεία, 329a5-8).
His agreement, however, is not unqualified; he does not agree that
the corporeal bodies that they have postulated as principles and
elements are, in fact, the "substrate matter" that they claim them to
be. To articulate their deficiency on this point, he compiles a second
list of predecessors who have postulated "something alongside the
previously mentioned [elemental bodies]" (παρά τα είρημένα, 329a89). One of these was an advocate of a single "matter" ((ίλη) who
treated this matter as unqualified corporeal (σωματικήν) matter,
existing as separable matter alongside the elemental bodies. Aristotle
does not mention any names, but his allusion to this "unqualified"
matter as "infinite" or "undifferentiated" (άπειρον) leaves little doubt
that he was thinking of Anaximander. This theory Aristotle considers
mistaken on the grounds that it is impossible for any body to exist
without some perceptible contrariety. It has to be at least either light
or heavy or cold or hot; it cannot be completely undifferentiated.
A better, but still inadequately developed, intuition of substrate
matter is to be found, Aristotle claims, in the Timaeus, where Plato
introduces the receptacle (πανδεχες) as a substrate prior to the socalled elem ents (υπ οκ είμ ενόν τι το ίς καλουμενοις σ το ιχείο ις
πρότερον) and compares it to the gold of which golden objects are
made (329al3-17).7 Aristotle finds two shortcomings in this theory:
first, it does not adequately differentiate the receptacle from the
elements that come to be in it and so does not define whether the
receptacle is separable from the elements. Aristotle no doubt thinks
that insofar as the πανδεχες is conceived as a container, it will be
separate from and independent of the elements and as such will be

6 These theories are discussed in more detail in Gen. Cotr. 1.1.
7 The reference is to Tun. 48b-51b, and esp. 50a-c.

- 5 detail on other occasions.
However, since the first bodies are derivative from matter in
precisely (και) this way (i.e., as m atter plu s p ercep tib le
contrariety), we now really have to differentiate even these things
(i.e., matter, contrariety, and the so-called elements) basing our
differentiation on the belief that the matter, which is inseparable
from Hiß perceptible bodies, but underlying the contrarieties, is a
principle and indeed absolutely primary (πρώτην). We have
drawn this conclusion regarding its primacy from the fact that
(yàp) the hot is not matter for the cold nor the cold for the hot,
but the underlying substrate is matter for both o f them.
Consequently (ώστε), (in order to articulate the differentiation
that our account requires and believing that the matter underlying
the perceptible contrarieties is a principle and ultimate) we contend
that, first of all (1), the potentially perceptible body is a
principle; secondly (2^, the contrarieties (I mean, for example,
heat and cold) are principles; and only (ήδη) in the third place
(3), fire, water and the like are principles. I rank fire, water, etc.,·
in the third place because (yap) they change into one another
(not as Empedocles and others mistakenly claim; for otherwise
there would be no such thing as alteration), whereas the
contrarieties do not change.
Nevertheless, even so, even having differentiated the principles
o f perceptible body and ranked their degree of ultimacy, we cannot
leave the subject of the elements and principles of perceptible body,
but we must discuss the particular identity and the particular
number of the various principles o f body. For the others (our
predecessors) have simply posited and used them, without giving
any account of why they are these particular ones and this
particular number (329a24-b6).
In the first paragraph of this passage, Aristotle presents the
conception of the underlying substrate matter that he himself accepts
as the ultimate principle of perceptible bodies. He presents it in
explicit contrast to the two predecessors who had intuitions of it. This
he does by two pairs of interlocked μέν . . . δέ antitheses. The μέιη
clause critiques the views of Anaximander and Plato (329a8-24), while
the δ έ j clause gives A ristotle’s alternative (329a24-27). This
alternative itself consists of a μ έ ν 2 . . . δέ2 opposition. The first μέν2

- 7 brought too many answers to the questions asked. By introducing
competing types of principles (matter and the so-called elements) and,
what is worse, competing sets of so-called elements, the theories of
Aristotle’s predecessors create a need for some kind of adjudication
of their competing claims. This is precisely what Aristotle begins to
do in the last two paragraphs of the chapter (329a27-b3).
Adjudication of the claims of the competing types of principles is
accomplished easily. Aristotle simply specifies the principles of
perceptible bodies in order of priority and in each case gives the
reason for his prioritization. Substrate matter, the first principle, is
prior to the contrarieties because it is a necessary condition for the
existence of the contrariety. One contrariety cannot be matter for
another; the substrate of both must be matter and hence primary
(329a31-32). The third set of principles, the actually perceptible
bodies which come from the combination of potentially perceptible
body and perceptible contrariety, is posterior to the contrarieties
because the perceptible bodies change into one another, whereas the
contrarieties themselves are unchanging (329a35-b3). In this way,
Aristotle differentiates and ranks the three kinds of principles o f
perceptible body: (1) the potentially perceptible body (matter), (2) the
perceptible contrarieties which cause the perceptibility of bodies, and
(3) the composite of these two, the first actually perceptible bodies, of
which fire and water are examples. .
In a final paragraph, Aristotle confronts the much harder task of
adjudicating among the sets of perceptible bodies that are competing
for the title of first (actually perceptible) bodies. This will occupy him
for the next two full chapters. Here he only announces his agenda and
his reasons for undertaking it. His agenda is to establish the number
and identity o f the principles he has just differentiated. The
differentiation (διορισμός) of different kinds of principles and their
ontological relationships did not and could not establish the identity
of the particular principles that fall under each kind. Matter, of
course, presented no further problem, because it is by definition
undifferentiated and single (cf. 1.6.322bl7-19); but the number and
specific identity of the perceptible contrarieties and of the first bodies
constituted by them is another matter.9

9
C om m entators usually take A ristotle here to be referring only to the
contrarieties and to introduce only Gen. Com 2.2; but Aristotle does not say anything
here that would restrict the scope o f his inquiry to the contrarieties either in his
announcement of his agenda or in his justification for undertaking the task. More
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step iri his undertaking. Our senses tell us that bodiès have all sorts of
perceptible properties, but not all are primitive and constitutive of a
primary perceptible body. Aristotle’s challenge is to decide which
ones they are. The number and nature of primary contrarieties, in
turn, will determine the number and nature of primary bodies. Every
different combination of primary contrarieties will constitute a
different primary body; one pair will constitute two primary bodies,
two pairs will make four primary bodies, three pairs will produce eight
bodies, and so forth. Also, whatever particular contrarieties are
primary will determine the nature of the first perceptible bodies from
which everything comes and in terms of which everything must be
explained. In short, the coherence and efficacy of Aristotle’s entire
schem e o f exp lanation in physical philosophy hangs on his
determination of the primary qualities.
The approach that Aristotle choses for this critical project is the
method of elimination. Therein lies one of the challenges of his
project for the modern reader. For Aristotle never ennumerates his ·
criteria of primacy; they must be deduced from his practice. That is a
challenging undertaking. Given the interdependence of the number
and nature of primary contrarieties and the number and nature of
primary bodies, there are two ways Aristotle can approach the
problem of their number and nature. He can start by establishing the
number and nature of the primary bodies and then examine how many
and which contrarieties will be required to produce these bodies. Or
he can determine independently how many and which contrarieties
are primary and then derive the number and nature of the primary
bodies from these. Aristotle choses the second. Starting from the full
range of perceptible properties, he eliminates all that fail to meet the
criteria of "primacy."
Aristotle conducts his elimination in two stages. First he eliminates
all but tangible contrarieties from consideration (329b7-16); then he
eliminates all but four of the tangible contrarieties, specifically, hot,
cold, wet, and dry (329bl6-330a29). The first stage is performed so
swiftly that we hardly notice what has happened:
Since (a) we are seeking principles of perceptible body, (b)
that is of tangible body, and (c) tangible is that of which touch is
the sensation, clearly (d) not all contrarieties constitute species
of body and principles (e.g. the primary bodies), but only those

-

11

-

contrariety" (κατ ’ έναντίω σίν τ€ yàp διαφέρουσι, καί κατά απτήν
έναντίωσιν, 329b 10-11).
The usual explanation for Aristotle’s lack of explanation is that he
equated perceptible body with tangible body. Some interpreters have
suggested he did so on the grounds that alt perceptible bodies possess
at least some of the tangible qualities','whërëas not allexhibit qualities
that are the objects of vision, hearing, taste, or smell.10 Another has
cited Aristotle’s thesis in De An. 2.2-3.413all-415al3 that touch is the
most fundamental sense and the only sense universal to all animals,
though he must acknowledge that this does not yield a valid argument
that tangible contrarieties are the defining properties of perceptible
matter.11 Still it is strange that Aristotle would leave an important
premise like the claim that perceptible body is equivalent to tangible
body not only unsupported, but unexpressed. In both declarations of
the move, Aristotle skips over the assumed equation and simply adds
the alleged equivalent ("tangible") to the previous proposition, in the
first instance as a self-evident replacement for "perceptible," in the
second as an addition ( x e . . . και).
I suggest that all these explanations are wrong. I would further
suggest that Aristotle does not and could not equate perceptible body
with tangible body, but that he understands "tangible" and "tangible
body" in their natural sense as sp ecies o f "perceptible" and
"perceptible body." Then his claim is not that one must seek the
principles of tangible body because tangible body is logically
equivalent to perceptible body or universally assumed iii Greek
culture, but that we must seek the principles of tangible body because
its specific principles are, in fact, the only principles for all perceptible
body.
The key to understanding Aristotle’s move here and the rapidity
with which he makes it must be his discussion in Gen. Corr. 1.6.
There, justifying his philosophical agenda for the rest of the treatise,
he says that a discussion of the status and genesis of the so-called
elements is a necessary precondition for discussing the genesis of
compound bodies; but prior to such a discussion of the first bodies, he
declares, one must clarify two hitherto inadequately articulated topics
(1.6.322bl-6). Everyone agrees, he argues, that the generation of the
so-called elements themselves and of compounds from these elements

10 E.g., Joachim (above, note 4) 201-202.
11 Williams (above, note 4) 157.
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tangible body is capable of mutual contact, so only tangible body can
function as principle in the explanation of genesis and destruction and
only tangible contrarieties qualify as principles.15
The second step in Aristotle’s search for the number and identity of
the contrarieties that constitute primary perceptible bodies gives
Aristotle more difficulty. He must determine which contrarieties are
primary and constitutive and which are not. He does this by collecting
all the recognized tangible contrarieties, then eliminating those that
do not qualify as principles. The tangible contrarieties that he starts
with are: hot-cold, dry-wet, heavy-light, hard-soft, elastic-brittle,
rough-smooth, and coarse-fine (329b 18-20).
His first elimination is of heavy and light, which are disqualified as
being capable neither of causing action nor of being affected. The
criterion itself (capable of causing action or being affected) he
justifies on the same grounds that we just considered with reference to
tangibility. The elements must be capable of mutual acting and being
affected, if they are to change into one another and mix to form
compounds. Any contrariety that does not act on something or is not
affected by something is disqualified. But then we must ask what he
means by saying that the heavy and the light "are not said to do
anything to something else (noielu τι erepoi/) or to be affected by
something else" (329b21-22). He admits that everything physical is
either heavy or light or both (1.6.323a7-9), and he has even admitted
that heavy and light things have the capacity to act or be affected"
(1.6.323a7-10). We can only assume that he holds that heavy and light
things do not act or experience effects qua heavy or light.16 Even

15 This claim entails that tangible contrarieties are prior to non-tangible
contrarieties. In a short digression he (329bl4-16) reconciles this with suggestions he
made elsewhere that vision is more valuable that touch and hence prior (cf. Eth. Nie.
1176a1; Probt. 886b35). This might suggest that visible contrarieties might be prior to
tangible. Aristotle does not deny that, but points out that the visible contrarieties of
tangible body are not properties o f tangible body qua tangible. Since only the
contrarieties of body qua tangible qualify as principles of genesis and destruction, the
priority of visible contrarieties in another sense does not affect the priority of tangible
contrarieties as principles of genesis and destruction.
16 Cf. Joachim (above, note 4) 204; and Williams (above, note 4) 158. Williams’
explanation that heavy and light do not communicate their contrariety to other things
is not a sufficient explanation. While it may be true that a heavy body does not make
light bodies heavy, in the way that a hot body warms à cooler body, Aristotle does not
construe the action o f heating as transmitting its own power, but he defines it as
"causing association among homogeneous things" (329b26-27). Heavy and light,

-
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that qualifies them to serve as causes of elemental and other kinds of
change in the world.
This last point bears further examination. Aristotle’s decision to
make perceptible qualities serve as constitutive principles of the
physical world obligated him to give the contrarieties an objective
physical status that the terms themselves tend to obscure. To the
modern reader "hot" and "cold" suggest a continuum of temperature
within which the alleged contrarieties cannot be located without a
percipient to distinguish the hotter from the colder. "Wet" and "dry"
have an additional problem. They suggest a mixture of ontologically
prior bodies (water and waterless stuff), and hence a derivative rather
than primary status. Aristotle had to escape both these implications if
he was to use these tangible properties as principles.18
A ristotle’s definitions show how he did it. He escaped the
subjectivity implied by hot and cold by grounding their difference in a
qualitative difference in the activity that defines their essence. Both
hot and cold possess the generic capacity of causing association
(σύγκρισίς); but the specific kind o f "association" is inherently
different for each. That difference can be recognized from the kinds
of objects that are susceptible to it. Hot causes association only of
things that are of the same kind (τα όμογβυη); cold brings together
and causes association of things of the same kind (όμογβυη) as well as
of things that are unrelated (τα μή ομόφυλα). Hot and cold differ,
therefore, in their objectively real effects.19 When hot acts upon
something, it segregates things by kind, causing aggregation and
coalescence of the things that are the same in kind. Its specific effect
on a body or mixture of bodies will depend on the nature of the
object, specifically its homogeneity or the nature of its heterogeneity,

18 To avoid this implication some translators prefer ’'fluid” and "solid,” but this
obscures the fact that the ambiguity is not only modern, but was felt already by the
Greeks themselves. When Aristotle explicitly discusses various senses in which "wet”
and "dry” were used, he shows that the Greek terms "wet" and "dry" ambiguously
denote either physical states or different mixtures of water and dry stuff (2.2.330al224). This shows it to be a real problem facing Aristotle, not merely a problem of
translation into English.
19 Aristotle adds a clarification and rebuttal of those who claim that fire (which
must be hot) "separates" (διακρίνείν) things, presumably by reducing compounds into
more elementary stuffs. Aristotle explains thait this activity is really "association”
(συγκρίυειν) viewed from a different perspective. The destruction and separation
really produces association of things of the same kind by removing what is not of the
same kind ( 2.2.329b27-29).
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are all referred (άναγονται) to the primary four" (2.2.330a24-25).
The word "led up to" or "referred to" (άνάγεσθαι) suggests that he
believes the remaining four pairs of contrarieties can be explained in
terms of the primary four and hence do not themselves qualify as
additional or prior principles. How precisely he thinks they are to be
explained has to be deduced from his practice.
One of the four pairs, smooth and rough, he simply ignores. We
can understand why. His definition of smooth and rough, given in the
Categories is that the smooth consists in "all the parts lying on a flat
plane," while the rough consists in "[some parts] extending beyond and
[others] not quite meeting [the surface] (Cat. 8.10a 17, 22). Smooth
and rough are, therefore, specific characteristics of the surface or
boundary of a body. Since the boundary has been stipulated by
Aristotle’s definitions to be the result of the contrarieties of wet and
dry, the pair of smooth and rough may be dismissed as derivative of
wet and dry directly, without further discussion. The other three pairs
are more problematic and philosophically interesting.
The first of these, thick and thin, Aristotle treats at some length,
thereby revealing his rationale (329b34-330a4). He begins with the
premise that the capacity to fill something (τό άι/αηληστικόι/) belongs
to the wet. His justification shows that he derived his first premise
from his definition of the wet. The wet, he says, is (1) "not bounded
by its own boundary, but (2) easily shaped or bounded." Then to this
definition he adds a contingent condition (contact with another body)
and the consequence of that contact, i.e., that it (3) "follows
(α κολουθεί^ ) the thing that touches it." This consequence,
conforming to the container with which it is in contact, is equivalent to
"the capacity of filling [something]." In other words, he argues that to
fill something is a capacity that wet derives from its nature as
absolutely shapeable with no capacity whatsoever, to retain shape on
its own; but, he contends, it is only present under one condition, an
interaction with another body. Thus it is a reactive affection that
occurs under a particular interactive condition. As a result, Aristotle
does not say "the wet is capable of filling" or "the capacity to fill is the
wet," but rather "the capacity to fill belongs to (literally "is of') the
wet." By this he means that it is one of the capacities of the wet when
the wet finds itself in the stipulated circumstances (in contact with a
container).
After having established this premise, Aristotle adds his second
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(λεπτοί/). He concludes by saying that the fine is "especially like that"
(μάλιστα τοιουτον), viz. (metaphorically) fine-parted, capable of
total contact with the surface of a container, and capable of "filling
[something]."
What Aristotle has done in this argument is to derive the "capacity
of filling [something] analytically from the nature of "the fine," which
he understands to be such as to cause its possessor to react in the way
that a body made of very small particles would react under the same
conditions. In the limiting case of small-parted stuff, which will be
identical with the case of continuous "thin" matter, there will be total
contact with another body. In other words:
Thin <— > Total contact <— > Capable of filling
The derivation of the capacity for filling from the definition of thé
fine follows the same strategy that he used in deriving the capacity for
filling something from the definition of the wet. In both cases the
capacity to fill is regarded as a logical implication of the definition of
the term under the condition of contact with another body. The fact
that the definitions logically imply the same affective response to
contact with a container gives Aristotle his warrant for claiming they
are not independent constitutive principles. Though Aristotle goes on
to use this warrant to exclude the thin and the thick from the status of
principles, he does not then draw the conclusion that they are
identical, that is, merely two names for the same property. He treats
each as a real physical property; This is enough to eliminate thin and
thick as a‘third pair of contrariety principles alongside hot and cold
and wet and dry, but it is not enough to warrant privileging wet and
dry over thin and thick. To discover Aristotle’s grounds for privileging
wet and dry, we must look more carefully at his procedure here and in
subsequent examples.
T h e only way Aristotle can show one of the two equivalent
contrarieties to be primary is to show that the other is derived from it.
Here Aristotle must show that thin is in some way a derivative o f the
wet. He expresses its derivative relationship unmistakably by claiming
that "the thin is of the wet” (του ύγροΟ), We must consider what he
means by that.
His actual argument runs as follows:

-
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state of easy shapeability.22 Aristotle gives us a clue as to what that
modification might be in Gen. Corr. 1.10, where in a discussion of
mixture he ranks wet things as the most easily mixed because they are
most divisible (διαιρετά). This he then explains by saying that "the
wet is most easily shaped (εύόριστον), unless it is elastic" (γλίσχρον,
1.10.328b 1-5).
Evidently, he has in mind to treat elastic and brittle like fine and
thick. Elasticity is to be defined in terms of divisibility, as thinness
was defined in terms of the ability to fill (something). Specifically, the
elastic is less easily divided than the wet. The wet, for its part;
possesses divisibility as a consequence of the shapeability (εύόριστον)
by which it was defined. Consequently, the elastic is derived from the
wet and may be explained in terms of the shapeability of the wet. But
in the case of the elastic, unlike the case of the thin, we are not left in
doubt as to why the wet is primary and the elastic is derived. The
elastic conforms only partially to the definition of the wet; the elastic
is easily shaped, but not nearly as easily as the wet. To some extent,
the elastic retains a shape of its own, at least enough to allow it to be
stretched somewhat without breaking. In so far as it is somewhat
shape-retentive, it possesses a defining characteristic of the dry. It is,
therefore, a contrariety that is not as totally "wet” as the wet itself, but
has some admixture of "dry" in it.
The conception of the pair of contrarieties elastic and brittle as
derived by "mixing" dry and wet is reflected even more clearly in the
description Of brittle as "completely dry (τό τελέως ξηρόν) so as to be
solidified on account of its lack of wetness (δΓ ελλειψιυ ύγρότηχος,
330a6-7).23 This description of what is brittle leaves no doubt that
Aristotle regarded the contrarieties as being mixed in the objects in
which they reside.
We are now beginning to get a clearer picture of how Aristotle
thought he could justify ranking wet and dry as principles while
making thin and thick, or elastic and brittle derivatives of wet and dry.
Wet and dry constitute a continuum that may be explained as a

22 In Meteor. 4-9.387a.ll-1,2 he describes elastic as being "ductile" as well as wet or
soft (έλκ τό ν 5 υγρ όν ου ή μαλακόν). Bodies whose compostion is like a chain
becom e elastic, he says, by interlocking (tf¡ έπαλλάξει) and so can extend and
contract to som e degree ( Meteor. 4.9.387all-14). This makes it clear that this
contrariety implies'a higher·degree of cohesion than wet does.
23 Brittle is characterized as "breaking quickly" (θραύεται t à κραΟρα ταχέως, Part.
An. 2.9¿>55a32)..

- 23 When a (solid) object conies into contact with the wet, the wet moves
away and, in fact, flows around the invading object.24 When a (solid)
object conies into contact with the soft, the soft retains its own
boundary, but that boundary yields into itself." Elsewhere, Aristotle
cites water and wax as examples of the difference between the wet
and the soft and points out that in the case of wax, but not of water,
the surface yields inward and becomes indented {Meteor. 4.9.386a 1826). Thus the soft belongs to the wet by virtue of possessing the same
characteristics of shapèability, but in lesser degree.
At the other end of the continuum, we find "the hard," which he
argues is a property of the solidified (πεπηγός). Since the solidified is
dry, he concludes that hard belongs to the dry (2.2.330all-12). His
reasoning here is similar to that regarding the brittle. There he
maintained that solidification is the result of being completely dry and
that solidity is equivalent to brittleness. Here he claims that hardness
is another result of the solidification that accompanies dryness.25
We may depict the relationship as follows:

<r~ Soft—>

<-— Hard

Aristotle’s rationale for making wet and dry principles and deriving
the other tangible qualities from them appears to have been the
greater explanatory power of wet and dry. Wet and dry, by mixing,
could explain the widest range of states of shapèability. The fact that

24 In 2.2.330a9 Aristotle says the wet changes position (μεθιστάμενοι/). In a
parallel explanation in Meteor. 4.4 .3 8 2 a ll-1 4 , he uses the word “flow around’
(άνχιπερικχτασθαι). At Meteor. 4.9.386a.25-26 he uses άνχιμβθίσχαχβι,
25 The argument is excessively brief and, as it stands, not very clear; but its
parallelism to the argument for the derivation of brittle from dry seems obvious. Cf.
Williams (above, note 4) 211.
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Once Aristotle has established the number and identity of the
primary contrarietijSS»,:the number and identity of the primary bodies
follows naturally and immediately. Though Aristotle does not
mention it again, the defining characteristic of any primary body is the
capacity to act and be affected, which leads him to assume without
discussion that the first bodies will be characterized by a pair of
contrarieties, one active and one passive. The four active and passive
contrarieties logically make four possible pairings. Theoretically, four
item s can form six com binations, but since these item s are
contrarieties and contrarieties cannot be combined with each other,
two combinations are impossible (viz. hot with cold and wet with
dry).28 That means that there can only be four combinations: (1) hot
and dry, (2) wet and hot, (3) cold and dry, and (4) cold and wet.
These, Aristotle points out, accompany the four simple bodies that
appear to our senses (τοις άπλοις φαιι/ομέι/οις σώμασι) in a rational
pattern (κατά λόγοι/).29 Fire is hot and dry, air hot and wet, water
cold and wet, and earth cold and dry. Then, having stipulated the first
bodies that qualify as principles, Aristotle appears to conclude his
argument by affirming that the differentiating characteristics are
distributed in a rational pattern (εύλόγως) to the first bodies and that
the number of first bodies is rationally grounded (κατά λόγοι/).
This might seem to be the end of the matter. He has fulfilled his
agenda of articulating the different kinds of principles of perceptible
matter, of identifying them, and of showing why they have to be the
particular number and particular ones that he claims. As he suggested
in raising the question in the first place, he is following in the wake of

28 We might note that they would also be ruled out on the grounds o f lacking
capacity for mutual action and affection, for a combination of two active or two
passive contrarieties would yield first bodies which could only act or only experience
affection, not both.
29 W illiams (above, note 4) 160 takes the phrase τοΐς άπλοις φαιι/ομέι/οις
σώμασι to mean "the apparently simple bodies," which he then takçs as a reference to
a later paragraph where Aristotle seems to say fire is not pure unmixed "hot-dry" first
body. Against this interpretation is Aristotle’s word order (άπλοις φαινομένοις) and
the fact that the whole movement of the argument demands that "simple bodies" refer
to the theoretically constituted hot-dry first body, φαιι/ομέι/οις, I should think, ought
to be explained, not by a paragraph later in the chapter, but by the very next sentence,
which is linked by yap. On this interpretation, see Joachim (above, note 4) 213. The
meaning of κατά λόγον is disputed. I shall return to it later.
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The conclusion that Aristotle reached regarding the number and
identity of the primary bodies is followed immediately by a review of
the predecessors that postulated one Or more of the primary bodies as
principles or elements. This cannot fail to remind readers, if they
have forgotten, that Aristotle’s entire theory of the principles of
perceptible body was presented as a rigorously argued clarification
and correction of his predecessors. The task that Aristotle just
completed, i.e., showing why the first bodies had to be precisely four ^
(earth, water, air, and fire) fell to Aristotle, by his own admission,
because this group of predecessors had declared a specific number of
corporeal bodies to be principles and elements without demonstrating
why. But their failure, in Aristotle’s eyes, could not have been only a
failure to justify their choice of number and nature of the primary
body or bodies. Their lack of agreement signaled a more fundamental ·>
failure. At least some of them had failed even to discern the correct
answer. That raises the question: why did Aristotle cite predecessors
who not only had followed an insufficiently rigorous method, but were
also patently wrong?
It must be noted that Aristotle did not cite all his predecessors on
the subject o f the elem en ts of perceptible body; he om itted
Anaxagoras and the atomists, though he included them in his review
of predecessors in Gen. Corr. 1.1.31 His reason can only be that
Anaxagoras and the atom ists held the number of elem ents or
principles to be infinite and the earth, water, air, and fire of our
experience, not to be simple, but composite bodies.3132 But if these
predecessors were omitted because o f thèir erroneous conception of
the principles or elements, why did he include others who also had an
erroneous conception, albeit one that was slightly closer to the truth?
When we look at the predecessors that Aristotle cited for his
conception of substrate matter, we see that both of them had seen
something of the truth. Plato was much closer; his only failure was
leaving some aspects undefined and failing to apply the concept aS
ex ten siv ely as he might have. But the other p red ecessor,
Anaximander, wrong as he was in making his principle corporeal, had
in his "Unbounded" at least a partially correct intuition that thére

31 The absence of Anaxagoras’ theory from the catalog of Gen. Con. 1.1 shows
that the omissions there cannot be based on Aristotle’s prior rejection of atomism.
32 Aristotle characterizes their views in Gen. Con. 1.1.314al4-bl.
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they divide the intermediate into one or two, Aristotle holds that their
theories may be taken together for conceptual analysis. Both
recognize as elements a pair of extremes (earth and fire) and an
intermediate which is explained as a mixture of the two extreme
elements (330b 13-19). Aristotle does not draw any explicit parallels
between this theory and his own, as he did in the case of the monists;
but he does use two words, "mean" (μέσοι/) and "mixture (μίγμα),
that remind us of concepts that play important roles in his own theory
of the formation of compounds.34
Finally, he gets to Empedocles, who starts off immediately with the
four simple bodies as elements. This, of course, does resemble an
aspect of Aristotle’s theory, but that resemblence turns out not to be
Aristotle’s concern here. Instead, he focuses attention on the fact that
when using his four elements as explanatory principles, he sets up an
opposition (άι/πιτίθησιι/) between fire and the other three (330bl921). This opposition so struck Aristotle that he noted it in Metaph. 1.4
as well, where he goes further and says that Empedocles treated earth,
air, and water as "one nature" (φύσις).35 Thus in Empedocles’ theory
of four principles of genesis and destruction Aristotle discovers a
significant opposition or antithesis operative in their interaction, an
opposition that sets fire against all the other elements.
As in the case of the proponents of two or three elements, Aristotle
draws no explicit parallels between the theory of Empedocles and his
own; but if we look ahead ten lines to the last major segment of the
chapter, we find a series of observations on the relationships among
the elements in Aristotle’s own theory (330b30-331a6). The order in
which he makes these observations and the nature of the relationships
held up for scrutiny shows a remarkable coincidence with the theories
just elucidated and suggests an overarching unity and purpose in this
final section.
The first observation Aristotle makes is that of the four elements
two belong to each of the two major regions of the universe. Fire and
air belong to those that move toward the periphery, whereas earth and
water belong to those that move toward the middle (330b30-33). The
natural movements of the four first bodies thus make an unmistakable
statement about an essential dichotomy underlying the four first

34 Cf. esp. Cien. Con. 2.7.
35 Fragment 62 (Diels-Kranz) may have been the kind of text to which Aristotle is
alluding.
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are thé two elem ents whose mixture constitutes the intermediate
element or elements. Aristotle’s treatment of extreme elements as
"purest" and intermediate as "mixed,” which Aristotle draws as a
corollary of their division into extremes and means, makes little sense
as a description of the theory he has been developing in Gen. Corr.
2.1-3; but it does make sense when it is construed as an observation of
the first bodies in the natural world.36 In the natural world of our
experience we never encounter pure elemental hot-wet "air," but we
live in ah atmosphere in which hot and wet are mixed with hot and dry
in such a way that the proportion of hot and dry diminishes as one
approaches the periphery of the sublunar world (Meteor. 1.3.340b 1429; l;4.341b6-24; 2.4.359b27-34, 360a21-27). Similarly, water and
earth tend to be mixed near the surface of the earth, whereas the
purest cold and dry is to be found near the center. Thus Aristotle
seems to be claiming in Gen. Corr. 2.3, not that some elemental bodies
are constituted from a mixture o f others, but that they are
encountered in the world mixed with the extreme elemental bodies.
Aristotle in Gen. Corr. 2.3 does not explain why this should be; he
simply asserts it. But in Gen. Corr. 1.10, in his explanation of mixture,'
he tells us that one of the properties derivable from wet and dry is
ease Of dlvisability and difficulty of disability. Ease of divisability, in
turn, he stipulates to be a necessary condition of mixture (1.10.328a33b23). On this theory, bodies endowed with "wetness" could be
expected to be more susceptible to mixture, whereas dry bodies could
be expected to be less susceptible. Thus he can ground this second
observable feature of the natural world in the contrarieties and their
distribution.

36
Joachim (above, note 4) 218 attempts to make it refer to the motions of the
intermediate first bodies on the grounds that the previous observation referred to the
two natural motions (toward the periphery and toward the middle); but though
Aristotle does say the intermediate bodies (air and water) move both up and down, he
never calls this characteristic "mixed” motion. In fact, he explicitly claims single
bodies never possess mixed motions; mixed motions aré indicative of compounds {De
Cae!. 3.3.302b5-7).
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perceived pattern of opposition, however, is still the same:
—Fire
Air
Water
Earth

Hot

This pattern of opposition (ενα ντία ) is peculiarly relevant to
Aristotle’s analysis of Empedocles in his final review of predecessors
(330bl9-21), since Empedocles made use of the process of opposition
(άντιτίθησιν) in explaining the interaction of the four elements; but
its relevance does not end with providing a parallel for the nature of
the relationship between sets of elements. Aristotle’s pattern of
opposition gives an explanation for the one opposition of Empedocles’
theory that he had not yet explained.
Aristotle’s explanation of the monists’ intuition of contrariety
between upward moving hot bodies and downward moving cold
bodies explained the opposition between fire and earth. H is
explanation of the dualists’ and triadists’ intuition of contrariety
between extreme (unmixed), dry elements and intermediate (mixed),
wet elem en ts explained the opposition betw een fire and the
intermediate body, the triadists’ air, the only intermediate primary
body postulated by any members o f this group (dualists and
triadists).37 Now, last of all, Aristotle’s explanation of the opposition
of fire and water on the basis of a doubly opposed pair of contrarieties
caps his explanation of Pre-Socratic intuitions by providing a n ,
explanation that, combined with the previous two, accounts for
Empedocles’ intuition of an antithesis between fire and the other
three elements.
Strictly speaking, it was unnecessary. Aristotle’s explanation of the
opposition between extremes and intermediates on the basis of the
contrarieties dry and wet had already grounded fire’s opposition to
water, which like air is wet. Why A ristotle added this final
observation on the double opposition of air and water (contrary in two
affections) is not explained. He may very well have wished to find a
Pre-Socratic intuition for each of the three possible divisions of the

37
A ristotle’s explanation also covered the pair o f perceptible bodies that
Parmenides postulated as intermediate; but on Aristotle’s interpretation of him as a
dualist, these bodies had to be regarded as compounds.
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There are problems, however, with such an interpretation. The
most Serious is that it cannot be reconciled with what we have found
to be Aristotle’s grounds for assigning primacy to the contrarieties,
hot, cold, wet, and dry. Aristotle’s principal reason for regarding
these as primaty to other definitionally related contrarieties was the
fact that they are the extremes, within which the others can be
explained as mixtures and hence derivative. It seems incredible that
after a procedure like that Aristotle could turn around and claim the
simple bodies are constituted by moderatedegrees of their constitutive
contrarieties.
I suggest that he never did. This passage, following immediately
upon his account of the theory of Empedocles and preceding his
correct (Aristotelian) explanation of the Pre-Socratic intiutions is, I
contend, a continuation of his account of Empedocles.38 It was, then,
Empedocles, not Aristotle, who alleged that the elemental bodies that
we perceive in the natural world are not simple, but mixtures, viz. of
more than one sim ple body, yet nam ed after the one that
predominates.39 It was Empedocles, too, who explained fire and ice
as excesses, again, of one of the (Em pedoclean) simple bodies.
Aristotle’s terminology and conceptualization in this passage is,
naturally, Aristotelian. Aristotle had shortly before, reinterpreted the
monists’ rarefaction and condensation as effects of the (Aristotelian)
active principles, hot and cold. Now, I suggest, he is reinterpreting
Empedocles in terms of his own Aristotelian theories. It is perhaps
not accidental that in his "interpretations" of all three categories of
Pre-Socratics, the Pre-Socratic explanatory principles turn out to be
ones that also appear in Aristotle’s own Meteorology and biological
works: boiling (ζ έ σ ις ) and solidification (πίιξις), mixture, and
condensation and rarefaction.
If we take 330b21-30 as Aristotle’s description of an Empedoclean
intuition of the role of heat in boiling and solidification, his
explanation of the paired opposition of elements (fire vs. water; air vs.
earth) and the perceived dominent tangible property of each element
has more point than if it only serves as one part of an explanation of

38 So it is treated by C. Mugler, Aristote: De la Génération et de la Corruption
(Paris 1966) 50-51.
39 The theory here described is consistent with and implicit in A ristotle’s
discussion of Empedocles in Gen. Con. 1.1. See Appendix below.
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concluded his declaration of the distribution of the primary qualities
among the primary bodies with the claim that as a result the
distribution is rational (εύλόγω ς) and the number of elements is
"rational" or "proportional" (κατά λ ό γ ο ν, 330b6-7). The precise
meaning of εύλόγως and κατά λόγον in this sentence is not obvious;
but if Aristotle was attempting to explain his predecessors’ errors in
counting the elements on the basis of this very distribution, we cannot
help suspecting that κατά λ ό γ ο ν refers to the rational pattern of
distribution of contrarieties, which displays different patterns when
viewed from different perspectives. Then he is claiming that this
rational pattern of distribution was noticed already by the earliest
theoreticians, but they misconstrued it. It took Aristotle to discover
the truth about this rational structure in nature and its role in the
history of philosophy.
With this clarification of the philosophical significance of the PreSocratic theories of elements Aristotle brings to a close his discussion
of the principles of perceptible bodies. He had embarked on this
subject with the intent of explaining the first bodies and their role as
principles of genesis and destruction. Jumping off from the theories
of the Ionian philosophers who first proposed simple elemental bodies
as principles of change, he probed behind these to discover even more
fundamental principles, one of which was anticipated by another
Ionian and by his teacher Plato. These ultimate principles will
become for Aristotle the foundation of all explanations of material
change in the natural world. In the end Aristotle’s exposition comes
around full circle to those Ionians from which it began, to show them
not so much as confused misadventurers in the quest for truth, but as
successful explorers who, without realizing what they had really done,
had caught a glimpse of the new world of imperceptible reality lying at
the very foundations of the universe. By showing how even the errors
of their incompatible and incorrect theories derived from the true
structure of the natural world as he himself had come to understand
it, Aristotle gained for his own theories the support of the wisest
philosophers of the past and at the same time forged the first links
with the phenomenal world that he proposed to explain.

-39they are only "hot-white", "cold-wet," "heavy-hard,” etc. Thus Aristotle
can claim that these "simple bodies" are "fiery, "watery," etc., but not
"fire," "water,” etc. However, after they have separated out and
collected into masses in which one kind predominates enough to
warrant the name "fire," "air," etc., they still are not com pletely
separated from each other. T he apparent genesis of one elem ent
from another is evidence of that. The only way Empedocles can
explain the (apparent) genesis of one element from another is to
assume that even relatively pure aggregations of the same kind of
element are nevertheless mixtures, including small portions of all the
others (cf. De Cael. 3.7). So fire must be deemed a mixture in which
there is a predominance of hot-white, which Aristotle then may
describe in his own vocabulary as an "excess of heat," or (translating
Empedocles’ "hot-white" into his own "hot-dry”) a "boiling of the hot
and dry."

